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CoNsTITunoNAL LAW-INTERSTATE CoMMERCE-CARRIERs-VALIDITY
OF STATE STATUTE REQUIRING RACIAL SEGREGATION OF

p ASSENGERS-Ap-

pellant, a passenger on a motor common carrier, was traveling from Virginia
to Baltimore. Pursuant to a Virginia statute 1 requiring all passenger motor
carrier vehicles to "separate without discrimination the white and colored passengers in their motor busses so that contiguous seats will not be occupied by
persons of different races at the same time" the driver of the carrier upon which
appellant was traveling requested her to vacate her seat so that it could be used
by a white passenger. She refused and was arrested and convicted under authority of a statute punishing such refusal. 2 The Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the conviction.8 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the appellant
contended that the Virginia statute violated the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution. Held, reversed. The statute was invalid and the appellant
was a proper party to raise the question. Morgan v. Virginia, (U.S. 1946) 66
S. Ct. rn50. 4

1 Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1942) c. 161A (Motor Vehicle Carriers} §§ 4097z4097dd, inclusive. § 4097z provides that "All passenger motor vehicle carriers • • •
shall separate white and colored passengers in their motor bosses." § 4097aa prohibits
"discrimination in the quality of convenience of the accommodations provided for the
two races .•••" § 4097bb authorizes the persons in charge of the carriers to adjust
the seating plan of the carriers with the proviso however that "no contiguous seats on
the same bench shall be occupied by white and colored passengers at the same time."
2 Id. § 4097dd.
8 184 Va. 24, 34 S. E. (2d) 491 (1946), noted, 32 VA. L. REV. 668 (1946).
Other state courts had taken a similar position-Southern Ry. Co. v. Norton, 112
Miss. 302, 73 S. I (1916); Smith v. State, IOO Tenn. 494, 46 S.W. 566 (1898).
Contra, Hart v. State, IOO Md. 595, 60 A. 457 (1905); Carrey v. Spencer, 72 St.
R. 108, 36 N.Y.S. 866 (1895); State ex rel. Abbot. v. Hicks, 44 La. Ann. 770, 11
s. 74 (1892).
4 Concurring opinions were written by Justices Black and Frankfurter while
Justice Burton dissented. The position of Justice Black should be especially noted for
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In view of the attitude of the present Court toward civil liberties generally,
the decision in the principal case was hardly surprising. While the specific issue
before the Court-the constitutionality of state legislation imposing segregation
requirement on carriers in interstate commerce-had never _been expressly determined, this general area has not been free from litigation. The historical
background, however, offered the Court no difficulty. Carrier-imposed segregation is not at issue. 5 Approval of statute-imposed segregation has be.en limited
to situations where the statute was construed to apply only to intrastate commerce. 6 Hall 'll. DeCuir,7 which invalidated a Louisiana statute prohibiting segregation, was relied on· heavily in the principal case. Whether a specific subject
matter Ii.es within an area demanding national treatment and therefore without
the orbit of state regulation, or is local in nature and subject to state control,
is not a matter of mechanical determinatio,n. The concepts are abstract and
'largely subjective in nature. No criteria have been developed by the Court to
make any individual determination fr.ee from personal value judgments.8 In
this light it would seem to be of little value to attempt to fit this decision into
any pattern developed in the commerce field,9 but it may be profitable to analyze
the Court's decision in an attempt to determine its attitude in regard to the
following qu.estions which are likely to arise. (I) Will the Court condemn all
segregation laws? ( 2) What position will the Court take with regard to state

a

it marks a departure from a position taken by him since his appointment to the Court.
He has vigorously championed the power of the states to regulate and tax interstate
commerce in the absence of congressional expression to the contrary. The only limitation placed by him on state power was that such legislation should not discriminate
against interstate commerce. For a recent expression of his oft-expressed position see
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515 (1945). However,
in the principal case, at 1059, Justice Black states, "So long as the Court remains committed to the 'undue burden on commerce formula,' I must make decisions under it."
Whether Justice Black's acquiescence in the majority position is permanent or merely
a temporary expedient .utilized in the present case remains to be seen .
5
•
Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910).
6 Louisville, New Orleans &.Texas Ry. Co.. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, IO S.Ct.
348 (1890); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. II38 (1896); McCabe v.
Atcheson, Topeka & San,ta Fe Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 19n) 186 F. 966, affd.,,235 U.S.
151, 35 S.Ct. 69 (1914); South Covington & Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 252
U.S. 399, 40 S.Ct. 378 (1920). The Court has been willing to accept state courts'
determinations of mere intrastate application of the statute and to construe statutes
narrowly to reach _the same result. See "The Supreme Court's Role in Jim Crow
Transporation," 3 NAT. B. J. II4 (1945).
1
95 U.S. 485 (1877).
8 The present Court generally seems to adopt the approach first enunciated in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 299 (1852). For a discussion of
the Commerce Clause generally see, Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power,"
27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940); and Ganoe, "The Roosevelt Court and the Commerce
Clause," 24 ORE. L. REv. 71 (1945).
·
9 See notes 16 and 17, page 1054 of the prin_cipal case.
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laws ,prohibiting segregation? 10 (3) Will the Court, although denying the
states the power to require segregation, permit common carriers to do so? 11 An
attempt to answer these questions requires a determination of the specific theoretical grounds upon which the Court based its decision. Unfortunately, these
are not easily ascertainable. It is not too clear whether the Court regards the
subject matter itself as demanding uniform treatment or whether the need for
uniformity stems from the burden imposed by the cumulative effect of state
action. The Cqurt stresses the fact that the Virginia statute authorizes motor
vehicle operators to require "any passenger to change his or her seat as it may
be necessary and proper" and that such authorization is a potential burden to
interstate commerce. A statute merely requiring separate cars or compartments
for colored and white passengers would not be subject to similar indictment 12
and, if the basis for the invalidation of the Virginia statute is the fear of cumulative burdens, such a statute should escape condemnation. By reference to such
analysis it is also possible to distinguish prohibitory statutes from those that affirmatively require segregation.18 But if the ground of its decision is that the
subject matter requires national treatment unless Congress decrees otherwise,
then logically not only statutes imposing segregation in whatever form but also
those prohibitory in effect would be unconstitutional. The Court, moreover,
seems to be unanimous in suggesting that prohibitory statutes are also unconstitutional. Both Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion and Justice Burton in his dissent explicitly adopt this point of view, while the majority opinion
seems to do so tacitly by its reliance upon Hall v. DeCuir,14 a decision that
rested squarely upon the ground that such a statute was a burden upon the carriers, and by its silence in the face of Justice Burton's assertion that such a result
would follow. No less difficulty is encountered in trying to determine whether
the Virginia statute is unconstitutional because it burdens the carrier or because
it interferes with the free passage of colored people from state to state. Although
the Court does not even faintly suggest that the Chiles case,1 5 which decided that
the burden was on the carrier, is no longer law, a good deal of language in the
principal case indicates that the Court was thinking in terms of burdens imposed
10
At this writing eighteen states prohibit racial separation on public carriers.
(See footnote 24, page 1056 of the principal case for a listing of these statutes.) Ten
states require separation on motor carriers. (See note 25 at page 1056.)
11
This question may be raised very shortly. The WASHINGTON AFRO-AMERICAN,
a Washington, D. C. newspaper, headlined its September 10, 1946 issue as follows:
"Bus Lines Snub Decision."
12
Of course there could be no discrimination in the facilities provided. Mitchell
v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 61 S.Ct. 873 (1941). However, as concerns motor
carriers such legislation would seem to be highly_ impractical.
18
Prohibitory legislation can hardly be said to impose a burden upon the carrier
for it would merely mean that the passengers would be free to select any seat available.
14
95 U.S. 485 (1877).
15
218 U.S. 71, 30 S.Ct. 667 (1910).
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upon the colored passengers.16 In summary, if the Virginia statut.e is invalid
because the subject matter requires uniform treatment, then all state regulationlaws requiring segregation as well as those prohibitory in nature~hould be
unconstitutional and self-imposed regulation by the carriers should meet the
same fate; and whether in theory the burden is on the carrier or on the individual passenger should be immaterial. On the other hand, if the ground of the
decision is the fear of burdens resulting from cumulative action, it should be
possible to uphold some affirmative segregation laws and those prohibiting segregation. Similarly, carrier-imposed regulation should escape condemnation for
the following reasons. If the burden is regarded as one on the carrier not
only would there be no possibility of cumulative burdens for conceivably the
carriers would set up uniform regulations, but also the Court would be face·d
with the policy adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission of sanctioning
such practice.17 Moreover, if the burden were on the passengers rather
than on the carriers the same arguments would have to be faced. The difficulty of considering the segregation question under the Commerce Clause with
the possible unfortunate result that segregation is not permitted in interstate
commerce but is valid in intrastate commerce could easily be avoided by invoking
the aid of the "equal protection clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 Nondiscriminatory segregation heretofore sanctioned by the Court under the Fourteenth Amendment owes its exis~ence, in part at least, to expediency-to the
feeling that racial questions were insoluble by direct attack and that it would be
foolhardy to attempt to carry out without qualification the mandate of the
amendment.19 The invalidation of the Virginia statute seems to be indicative
of a desire to refuse to compromise on questions involving racial issues. In this
16

See principal case at 1056. See also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62
S.Ct. 164 (1941).
17
Sec. 3(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 U.S.C. (1940)] provides that
"It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act •.. to
subject any particular person ••. to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever." The commission has interpreted this section to permit
segregation between ·races as long as equal accommodations are furnished to them.
Councill v. Western & Atlantic R.R. Co., I I.C.C. (1st Ser.) 638 (1887); Gaines v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 16 I.C.C. 471 (1909); Crosby v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., II2 I.C.C. 239 (1926). However, the commission's decisions were based
on the fact that the courts generally had upheld such separation of races as a "reasonable police regulation." Whether the commission's interpretation, therefore, can be
said to be an expression of national policy on this subject as far as the Commerce Clause
is concerned is arguable.
18
One of the grounds of Justice Burton's dissent was that the question is primarily
one that should be considered under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the
Commerce Clause.
19
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. n38 (1896). Baker, "Segregation
of White and Colored Passengers on Interstate Trains," 19 YALE L. J. 445 (1910);
Baker, "Trend of United States Supreme Court Decisions as Affecting Negroes'
Rights," 1 NAT. B. J. 30 (1941).
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light if the Court were to decide that "Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens" 20 a more logical and satisfactory solution could be reached.

George Brody, S. Ed.

20

Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 559, 16 S.Ct. 1138 (1896).

